Dissenting Stockholders\u27 Rights in Virginia: Exclusivity of the Cash-Out Remedy and Determination of  Fair Value by Macrae, Howard T., Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 3 Article 3
1978
Dissenting Stockholders' Rights in Virginia:
Exclusivity of the Cash-Out Remedy and
Determination of "Fair Value"
Howard T. Macrae Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howard T. Macrae Jr., Dissenting Stockholders' Rights in Virginia: Exclusivity of the Cash-Out Remedy and Determination of "Fair Value",
12 U. Rich. L. Rev. 505 (1978).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/3
DISSENTING STOCKHOLDERS' RIGHTS IN VIRGINIA:
EXCLUSIVITY OF THE CASH-OUT REMEDY AND
DETERMINATION OF "FAIR VALUE"
Howard T. Macrae, Jr. *
Until relatively recent times, the generally accepted rule was that
a corporation could not merge, consolidate or sell all of its assets
without the unanimous consent of its stockholders.' Each stock-
holder was accordingly vested with an individual right of veto over
any such corporate action from which that stockholder might dis-
sent. In order to eliminate this shackle on corporate activity, state
legislatures enacted legislation permitting corporations to enter into
such so-called "extraordinary transactions" as mergers, consolida-
tions and sales of all or substantially all of the corporate assets upon
some specified majority vote of all of its stockholders. The price
extracted for this accommodation is the ability of dissenting stock-
holders to perfect a right to object that would enable their stock
interests to be repurchased by the corporation for the value of that
interest.
Virginia has recognized since 19032 the right of stockholders in
corporations organized and existing under the laws of Virginia, to
dissent and demand receipt of the "fair value" of their stock, rather
than be compelled to participate in their corporation's extraordi-
nary transactions, which have the effect of fundamentally altering
its identity.3 This right is now embodied in two sections of the Vir-
• B.A., University of Virginia, 1973; J. D., University of Richmond, 1976. Presently counsel
with the Richmond Corporation, Richmond, Virginia.
1. See 13 FIxrcHia Cyc. CORP. (Rev. Vol. 1970) § 5906.1; E. L. Foix, IMI, THE DELAM ARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, 321 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FOLK]; Note,
Corporations-Rights of Dissenting Stockholders Pending Statutory Appraisal Proceedings,
21 VA. L. REv. 825, 829 & n.17 (1935).
2. 1903 Va. Acts, Ex. Sess., ch. 270 at 437.
3. The term "dissenters' rights" properly should apply to the right of a stockholder dissent-
ing from approval of his corporation's extraordinary transaction to obtain as payment for his,
shares, their "fair value." In this sense, the right might be denominated as "cash-out rights."
The term "appraisal rights," while often used interchangeably with the aforementioned terms
(perhaps with justification inasmuch as the corporation must "appraise" the "fair value" of
shares), in this article will be used to describe a dissenter's ability to seek a judicial determi-
nation of "fair value" where agreement cannot be reached between the corporation and the
dissenter. See Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights,
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ginia Stock Corporation Act: (1) section 13.1-75 which applies to
mergers, consolidations, or to the exchange of any class of stock
pursuant to certain specified plans of exchange;4 and (2) section
13.1-78 which extends the right to "sale or exchange of all or sub-
stantially all of the property or assets of a corporation otherwise
than in the usual and regular course of its business .... ." Although
the provisions describing the rights of dissenting stockholders are
set out in two separate sections of the Code, this package of statu-
tory rights should be considered a unitary concept because the lan-
guage of these sections and the remedy conferred by each are vir-
tually identical.
In inquiring into this remedy, the first question that arises is
whether it constitutes the exclusive remedy to the dissenting stock-
holder who is dissatisfied with the terms of an "extraordinary"
transaction. If answered in the affirmative, then just how is this
"fair value" to be determined? Accordingly, the purpose of this
discussion is first to examine the circumstances under which this
right is available, and to what extent this right to demand "fair
value" is the exclusive remedial procedure under Virginia law.' In
addition, an analysis is set forth of how "fair value" is determined
under Virginia law.
I. THE STATUTES
Broadly speaking, under these two sections, the corporation,
whether it be the selling, surviving or consolidated corporation, is
required to make a "good faith" offer to each dissenting stockholder
who has perfected his right to "fair value" (which offer is to be
uniform with regard to all dissenters of the same class of stock and
to be accompanied by certain current financial information),7 and
A Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1856 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Changes].
4. The "plans of exchange" specified are those pursuant to VA CODE ANN. § 13.1-2(c)
(Repl. Vol. 1973).
5. Although the language of § 13.1-78 applies to "a corporation" affecting a sale of all or
substantially all of its assets, without specifically limiting the section's applicability to a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of Virginia, that is the interpretation to
be accorded it. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-2(c) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
6. While there may, in many cases of perceived wrongs, be possible claims or remedies
under the federal securities laws, a discussion of these laws is beyond the scope of this article.
7. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75(d); 13.1-78(d) (Supp. 1977).
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if no offer is made, or the parties fail to agree, then there is to be
an appraisal of the "fair value" of the stock by judicial determina-
tion in the appropriate Virginia circuit court.' This judicial ap-
praisal proceeding is declared by the statute to be "an action
against [the dissenting stockholders'] shares quasi in rem."9
The right of a dissenting stockholder to avail himself of the Vir-
ginia dissenters' rights statutes in cases of mergers or consolidations
was significantly limited in 197211 with the addition of the "stock
market exemption,"" or "Wall Street Rule," which provides that in
the absence of a contrary provision in the articles of incorporation,
the right to demand "fair value" shall be withdrawn from holders
of a class or series of stock where the class or series was, at the record
date for voting on the transaction, listed on a national securities
exchange or held of record by more than 2,000 persons.2 The "Wall
Street Rule" was grafted onto section 13.1-78 in 1975."1
The rationale behind this limitation is that the right of a dissenter
to demand "fair value" for his stock holdings, in essence, requires
the creation of a "forced market" for these securities, which is an
unnecessary luxury where there is already a substantial public
trading market for the stock.'" The existence of such a market is
presumed by the sections where the stock in question is listed for
trading on a national securities exchange or held by 2,000 or more
stockholders, a number of holders large enough to infer to a substan-
tial public trading market."
8. Id. §§ 13.1-75(f); 13.1-78(f).
9. Id.
10. 1972 Va. Acts, ch. 425 at 489.
11. See Changes, supra note 3, at 1856.
12. VA. CODE AN. §§ 13.1-75(i)(2); 13.1-78(i)(2) (Supp. 1977).
13. 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 500 at 921. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-78(i)(2) (Supp. 1977).
14. See FOLK, supra note 1, at 391. The section of the Delaware Code (tit. 8, § 262) making
provision for dissenters' rights (which applies only to mergers and consolidations) contains
the "Wall Street Rule," and except for inclusion of a provision withdrawing such rights where
vote of the stockholders is required for a merger pursuant to DEL. CODE AN. tit. 8, § 251(f),
as well as nomenclature variations, the rule is virtually identical to the Virginia version, and
its interpretations may serve to provide understanding of the latter. Delaware's "Wall Street
Rule" is particularly relevant in a discussion of the Virginia version inasmuch as enactment
of the Delaware version provided the "catalyst" to the original adoption of the rule in § 13.1-
75. See Note, Seventeenth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: Business
Associations, 58 VA. L. Rav. 1172, 1179 (1972).
15. Folk, Corporation Law Development - 1969, 56 VA. L. Rav. 755, 796 (1970).
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However, there is a limitation on the operation of the Rule con-
tained only in section 13.1-75. The "Wall Street Rule" does not
operate to withdraw the right to demand "fair value," where in the
case of a merger, consolidation, or exchange of stock, the holders of
a class or series of stock are required to accept for such stock a form
of consideration other than:
(I) shares or shares and cash in lieu of fractional shares of the surviv-
ing, new or acquiring corporation; or (H) shares or shares and cash
in lieu of fractional shares of any other corporation which, at the
record date fixed to determine the stockholders entitled to receive
notice of and to vote at the meeting at which the plan of merger,
consolidation or exchange is to be acted on; were either registered on
a national securities exchange or held of record by at least two thou-
sand stockholders; or (III) a combination of shares or shares and cash
in lieu of fractional shares as set forth in (I) and (II) .... 1
Thus, in order for the "Wall Street Rule" to withdraw dissenters'
rights from a class of stockholders in cases of mergers, consolida-
tions and plans of exchange, the class of holders must be required
to take stock ("or shares and cash in lieu of fractional shares"), so
as to maintain some equity interest with the "surviving, new or
acquiring corporation," or with "any other corporation" (usually the
parent of a constituent corporation) whose stock in question has a
substantial public trading market, as evidenced by its meeting the
threshold trading requirements.17 There is no such qualification on
the operation of the "Wall Street Rule" contained in section 13.1-
78.
Generally speaking then, under Virginia law, dissenters' rights are
available to the stockholders of any Virginia-domiciled corporate
party in a merger, consolidation and plan of exchange, and to the
stockholders of a Virginia corporation effecting a sale of all or sub-
stantially all of its assets. If a class or series of stock is not listed
for trading on a national securities exchange, or not widely-held
within the meaning of the "Wall Street Rule," or even if it is so
actively traded but the articles of incorporation of the issuer so
provide, the holders of this class or series are entitled to assert
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-75(i)(2) (Supp. 1977).
17. See FOLK, supra note 1, at 395.
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dissenters' rights. The one caveat to this broadly painted summary
is that a class or series otherwise qualifying under the "Wall Street
Rule" whose holders dissent from a transaction contemplated by
section 13.1-75 must receive stock which qualifies as discussed in
the previous paragraph, and if this is not the case, such dissenters
too are entitled to assert dissenters' rights. Thus, the availability of
dissenters' rights can differ among the stockholders of the same
corporation, depending upon which class of stock is held and what
consideration is being offered therefor.
Both Code sections specifically provide that the circuit court of
the city or county where the domestic corporation involved in the
transaction has (or last had) its registered office or principal place
of business shall be the forum where all claims for appraisal must
be consolidated regardless of the claimants' place of residence, thus
eliminating a possible multiplicity of actions in various courts which
is harmful to both the corporation and its stockholders."8 However,
18. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75(f); 13.1-78(f) (Supp. 1977). The predecessor sections under
the old law similarly provided that all such appraisal proceedings be brought in the one local
court where the corporation had its registered office or principal place of business. See Adams
v. United States Distributing Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 788 (1946); O'Hara v. Pittston Co., 186 Va. 825, 42 S.E.2d 263, 274 (1947); Pittston Co.
v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63 S.E.2d 34, 36 (1951). See also Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193 (2d
Cir. 1945) (applying Virginia law); McGhee v. General Finance Corp., 84 F. Supp. 24, 25
(W.D. Va. 1949) (applying Virginia law). But see Poe v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 376 F.
Supp. 1054, 1059 (E.D. Md. 1974); Sheridan v. American Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 121
(E.D. Pa. 1955).
Along similar lines, Virginia vests exclusive right to administer the fundamental changes
of corporate status by amendments, mergers, consolidations or sales of all assets except in
cases of fraud, through her State Corporation Commission, by virtue of VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
125 (Supp. 1977), with the right of appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. In support of that
exclusive and uniform administration, § 13.1-125 denies authority in such matters to any
court within or without Virginia to enjoin any directors' or shareholders' meetings to consider
such matters or to enjoin a submission to the State Corporation Commission for the entry of
an order, except in cases of fraud, or to enjoin in any case the operation of an order when
entered. See O'Brien v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 207 Va. 707, 152 S.E.2d 278 (1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 825 (1967); Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills Co., 133 Va. 717, 77 S.E. 309,
312-13 (1912). The design of this section is to obligate the State Corporation Commission to
issue certificates evidencing such fundamental changes of corporate status where, in the
absence of fraud, all of the statutory requirements have been met, including, presumably,
both substantive and procedural law. Gibson & Freeman, A Decade of the Model Business
Corporation Act in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 1936, 1404 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Gibson &
Freeman]. See O'Brien v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., No. 17551, 63 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE
CoRs. COMM'N OF VA. 137 (1965).
One of the basic purposes of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act was to proclaim exclusive
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the holding in one federal district court case raises the specter of a
multiplicity of appraisal proceedings in federal or state courts all
over the country, or possibly, one such suit in a forum outside Vir-
ginia. 19
The statute provides that any stockholder of record who follows
the prescribed statutory procedure may dissent and demand the
"fair value" of his stock. This value is to be exclusive of "any appre-
ciation or depreciation solely in anticipation of the proposed corpo-
rate action,"20 as is required in a number of other jurisdictions.2 1 In
the event that a stockholder and the corporation cannot agree on the
value of the shares, the corporation must commence a suit in equity
praying the circuit court to determine (without a jury) their "fair
value," and must join as parties all dissenting stockholders except
those who have already reached agreement as to price; should the
corporation fail to do so, "any dissenting stockholders may do so in
the name of the corporation. ' 2 The circuit court is empowered to
seek expert opinion in this statutory appraisal proceeding by ap-
pointing one or more appraisers, whose expenses shall be assessed
against the corporation or apportioned among dissenting stockhold-
ers deemed to be acting in bad faith.23 The Code sections allow the
jurisdiction over such "internal affairs" of Virginia-domiciled corporations. Gibson and Free-
man, supra, at 1405. It is one thing for a state to proclaim its exclusive jurisdiction and quite
another for her sister states to recognize such a claim of authority. Indeed, at least one state
supreme court has refused to recognize this claim of exclusive jurisdiction found in § 13.1-
125. O'Brien v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 44 N.J. 25, 206 A.2d 878 (1965), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 825 (1967). When this section was grafted upon the work of the Model Business
Corporation Act, it was noted that such a denial of jurisdiction to the courts of any foreign
jurisdictions would be feeble if not for the fact that the subject of the regulation, the "internal
affairs" of the corporation, has traditionally been held to be within the exclusive power of
the state of domicile. See Gibson, The Virginia Corporaton Law of 1956, 42 VA. L. REv. 445
& 630, 623 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Gibson].
19. Poe v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Md. 1974). See note 7
supra. The Illinois statute in question there should be distinguished because it did not provide
a specific domestic forum in which to hold the appraisal proceeding. A major factor influenc-
ing the district court's decision in the Poe case was the expiration of the Illinois statutory
period in which to bring the suit for appraisal of their shares: "Finally, the 90-day period of
limitations for the bringing of this action in a state court in Illinois has now run so that if
this court declines to accept jurisdiction, plaintiffs would be without remedy." 376 F. Supp.
at 1059. See also Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961).
20. VA. CODE ANmN. §§ 13.1-75(a); 13.1-78(a) (Supp. 1977).
21. See note 59, infra.
22. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75(f); 13.1-78(f) (Supp. 1977).
23. Id.
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court to assess any or all of the costs against the dissenting stock-
holders if the court finds their failure to accept the corporation's
offer to have been "arbitrary or vexatious or not in good faith."
Should the court find that the value of the shares "materially ex-
ceeds" the amount offered by the corporation, or if no offer was
made, the court may award to the stockholders the reasonable ex-
penses of experts employed by them in the action. However, each
party must bear the expense of counsel employed by him. 4
Subsection (f) of both sections provides that "[t]he judgment
shall include an allowance for interest at such rate as the court may
find to be fair and equitable in all the circumstances from the date
on which the vote was taken on the proposed corporate action to the
date of payment." The interest rates in Virginia have been as-
sessed at two percent in Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 26 and at six
percent in both Home Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. Lawrence,27
and In re Plummer.18
With some slight flexibility for "inadvertance," the prescribed
time periods and procedures are of the essence, and generally the
stockholder will lose his right if he does not follow them strictly. 9
In addition, cases under Virginia law hold that, if the proceedings
were in accord with the statutory requirements, the right to receive
"fair value" is the exclusive remedy in the absence of fraud or bad
faith."0
24. Id. See Note, Twentieth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law, 1974-1975:
Business Associations, 61 VA. L. Rv. 1650, 1664 (1975). In this regard, Virginia has what has
been classified as a "bad faith" statute. See Note, The Dissenting Shareholders' Appraisal
Statute: Influence of Cost and Interest Provisions on the Efficacy of the Remedy, 50 B.U.L.
REv. 57, 73 (1970).
25. See Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63 S.E.2d 34 (1951); In re Plummer, Chancery
Court of the City of Richmond, October 10, 1933, appeal denied, Tobacco Products Corp. v.
Plummer, 161 Va. xvii (1934); Note, Corporations-Rights of Dissenting Stockholders Pend-
ing Statutory Appraisal Proceedings, 21 VA. L. REv. 825 (1935).
26. 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147 (1964).
27. Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, March 28, 1973.
28. Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, October 10, 1933, appeal denied, Tobacco
Products Corp. v. Plummer, 161 Va. xvii (1934). See Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63
S.E.2d 34, 44-7 (1951) (Hudgins, C.J., dissenting).
29. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Aar § 81, p. 447 (1971); J. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of
the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 1189, 1201 (1964).
30. Adams v. United States Distrib. Corp., 182 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244 (1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 788 (1946); Craddock-Terry Co. v. Powell, 180 Va. 242, 22 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1942),
modified, 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E.2d 363 (1943) (case decided under wording of MICIE CODE,
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Despite the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy where the stock-
holder is dissatisfied with the corporation's offer there is New York
precedent holding that it is not an absolute right but discretionary
with the court, and should not be wielded as an offensive weapon
nor employed to cause "unwarranted expense or embarrassment to
the corporation and its majority shareholders." '31
As a result of the rewording of both Code sections by the General
Assembly in 1975 (especially the inclusion of the requirement that
the dissenter notify the corporation in writing of his desire to exer-
cise his right of dissent, the number of shares as to which he will be
asserting such rights, which notice must be received by the corpora-
tion prior to the vote on the triggering transaction or mailed by the
shareholder "not less than five days prior to the date on which the
stockholders vote on" such transaction) 32 these sections are now
weighted in favor of corporate management. One commentator has
noted that:
the net effect of the 1975 revisions (despite the new notice provisions)
should be to make their exercise of such rights even more expensive
and make disputes with the corporation over the fair value of dissent-
ing shares somewhat more of a financial risk. From the point of view
of management, on the other hand, the revisions are clearly desirable.
Appraisal statutes have been a source of considerable difficulty for
the corporation, especially where the dissenter is not required to give
notice of his objection until after the merger or other action is com-
pleted. Management faces an uncertainty concerning the amount of
cash needed to pay off the dissenters. In addition, such statutes carry
the potential for abuse by the stockholder who finds himself in a
position to make a side deal in return for not dissenting. A principal
benefit to management from the 1975 revisions to the Virginia statute
1942, § 3820a which also gave dissenters rights under "the general law."); McGhee v. General
Finance Corp. 84 F. Supp. 24 (W.D.Va. 1949); Sheridan v. American Motors Corp., 132 F.
Supp. 121 (E.D.Va. 1955); Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 1945) (invoking
"internal affairs" doctrine); Note, Corporations-Appraisal Statutes, 37 VA. L. REv. 901
(1951).
31. Corwin v. Shelter Island Light & Power Co., 199 N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1960). Cf. In re Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1948), modifying inpart,
191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1948) (dissenting shareholder owning 50 shares of R. H. Macy
& Co. preferred stock out of 1,650,000 shares of stock outstanding denied subpoena seeking
production of multitudinous books and records of corporation and all of its subsidiaries).
32. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75(c)(i)(A); 13.1-78(c)(i)(A) (Supp. 1977).
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should be the opportunity to determine in advance the extent of
stockholder opposition to a proposed [transaction]. 3
II. EXcLUSIVITY OF CASH-OUT REMEDY
Following an affirmative vote of the required proportion of the
stockholders of the corporate parties for a proposed plan of merger,
consolidation, sale or exchange of all or substantially all the assets
of a Virginia corporation, or for a qualifying exchange of shares, a
stockholder of a Virginia corporation which is a party to the transac-
tion who is dissatisfied with the consideration being offered for his
stock under the plan adopted has, as his only legal remedy for this
perceived wrong, a statutory right of valuation and cash-out of his
investment under sections 13.1-75 and 13.1-78. 31 This was also the
situation under prior versions of these Code sections with a stock-
holder having "an election either to dissent and secure in the pre-
scribed manner the fair cash value of his stock, or if he fails to
dissent, to be bound by the terms of the merger."3 No independent
suit in equity can be maintained for that purpose.3 6 Prior to a radical
change in 19 22 37 in the section governing dissenting stockholders'
rights where merger or consolidation had been involved, it has been
held that cash-out was not the exclusive remedy open to dissenters
33. Note, Twentieth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law, 1974-1975: Business
Associations, 61 VA. L. REv. 1650, 1665 (1975). See Note, The Dissenting Shareholders' Ap-
praisal Statute: Influence of Cost and Interest Provisions on the Efficacy of the Remedy, 50
B.U.L. Rev. 57 & n.15 (1970); J. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's
Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L. Rev. 1189, 1201 (1964). The prospective delays and attendant
uncertainties, including the item of interest, which is discretionary with the court, can be
expected to dampen any dissenter's appetite for an appraisal proceeding and incline him
toward acceptance of the corporation's "good faith" offer. The judicial battles involving these
appraisals have been known to be drawn out over years: 8 years, Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191
Va. 886, 63 S.E.2d 34 (1951) (a particularly bitter battle fought in federal courts and state
courts in Virginia and New York); 5 years, Craddock-Terry Co. v. Powell, 181 Va. 417, 25
S.E.2d 363 (1943); and 3-1/2 years, Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147
(1964).
34. Adams v. United States Distrib. Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 780 (1946); Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63 S.E.2d 34, 36 (1951);
O'Hara v. Pittston Co., 186 Va. 324, 42 S.E.2d 269, 274 (1947); Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193,
196 (2d Cir. 1945); Note Corporations-Rights of Dissenting Stockholders Pending Statutory
Appraisal Proceedings, 21 VA. L. Rev. 825, 827 (1935).
35. Adams v. United States Distrib. Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1946).
36. Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63 S.E.2d 34, 36 (1951).
37. 1922 Va. Acts, ch. 380 at 625, 632-34.
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and that they were "not bound to follow the statutory procedure.''38
However, in 1945 the Supreme Court of Appeals noted that the
silence on the subject of the exclusivity of the cash-out remedy
existing in the pre-1922 law had been cured, and that cash-out
pursuant to the statutory provision was then the "exclusive rem-
edy" for mergers and consolidations.3 1
Cash-out had been held not to be the exclusive remedy under the
section governing the sale of all or substantially all of the corporate
property because the statute entitled dissenting stockholders to the
then standard of "fair cash value" to be determined in the same
manner as afforded a dissenting stockholder in a merger of consoli-
dation "and/or as now exists under the general law.... " The section
went on to say, "but nothing herein contained shall deprive any
stockholder of existing remedies at law or in equity in the event of
fraud or inadequacy of consideration.... ."" This language has been
omitted since the revision of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act in
1956,41 with the language of both sections and the rights provided
thereunder being virtually identical. Therefore, under Virginia law,
cash-out is now equally the exclusive remedy for dissenters to a sale
or exchange of all the corporate assets as it is for those stockholders
dissatisfied with an exchange, merger or consolidation.
The interpretation that cash-out was to be the exclusive remedy
afforded under the 1956 general revision of the law is confirmed by
Mr. George D. Gibson, who was Special Counsel for the Commission
which drafted the Virginia Stock Corporation Act of 1956.42 This
intent has been carried through to the present version of these two
sections as evidenced by the declaration in both that "the right to
the fair value of shares under this section is contingent upon compli-
ance with the requirements of this section. 43
38. Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills, 113 Va. 717, 724, 75 S.E. 309, 312 (1912).
39. Adams v. United States Distrib. Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244, 248-9 (1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1946).
40. MIMnE's CODE § 3820a (1942); Craddock-Terry v. Powell, 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E.2d 363,
372-3 (1943).
41. 1956 Va. Acts, ch. 428 at 519-20, 522-24.
42. "The [appraisal remedy] is intended to be an exclusive remedy so that no cash award
may be made in an equitable proceeding whether in Virginia or elsewhere. This will effectuate
the ancient maxim that equality is equity." Gibson, supra note 18, at 470.
43. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75(b); 13.1-78(b) (Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 12:505
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If the cash-out remedy was not the exclusive remedial procedure,
values determined by the different courts or even the same court
might vary substantially depending upon the nature of the claim
asserted by the dissenting stockholder. A plethora of possible reme-
dies would invite a multiplicity of suits in state and federal courts,
which tribunals of necessity would be inquiring into the basic fair-
ness of transactions which should be subject to Virginia law as ap-
plied by Virginia courts.44
To follow a contrary course would be to displace the "practical
market test" of the adequacy or "fairness" of such a transaction
with the judicial process, which, with the benefit of hindsight,
would be second-guessing in the light of later-discovered evidence.
Accordingly, Virginia
[flollowing the Model [Business Corporation] Act .... rejects the
view that any administrative tribunal should be authorized to review
a plan for fairness and permit only approved plans to be carried out.
Like most other states, Virginia has never had such a practice. By the
same token the new Act rejects the view that any judicial tribunal
should be authorized to review a plan for fairness and reverse and set
aside any plan it may deem unfair."
Instead, evaluation of the elements of "fairness" is left to the indi-
vidual stockholder, who is given ample opportunity for reflection on
this question through notice and required disclosures under various
Code sections." Failure to comply with these statutory requirements
is sufficient grounds for the State Corporation Commission to re-
44. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that a majority
stockholder's alleged breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in effecting a short-form cash-
for-stock merger under Delaware law for the purpose of eliminating minority interests without
any valid business reason was not a violation of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
thereunder, because such conduct was not manipulation or deception, but corporate misman-
agement, which as an "internal affair" of the corporation is left to state regulation). The
Supreme Court stated: "minority shareholders could either accept the price offered or reject
it and seek an appraisal in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The choice was fairly presented
and they were furnished with all relevant information on which to base their decision." Id.
at 1303. But see Singer v. Magnavox Co., Sac. REG. & L. REP. (B.N.A.) October 5, 1977, E-1
(Del. Sup. Ct.).
45. Gibson, supra note 18, at 618.
46. E.g., VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-26; 13.1-68; 13.1-69.1; 13.1-70; 13.1-75(d); 13.1-78(d)
(Supp. 1977).
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voke any order issuing a certificate of merger.47 On this subject, Mr.
Gibson states:
While a change is not to be rejected by a court because it may disap-
prove on grounds of fairness, this result depends upon compliance
with the statutory requirements. If in any case there be circumstan-
ces to invalidate the vote as an authentic expression of the owners'
preference, the policy of the [Virginia Stock Corporation] Act is not
being met and the court should be alert for fraud."
While the general view is that courts will not undertake to review
the action of a specified stockholder majority on grounds of fairness,
they will entertain review of an action challenged on grounds of
fraud49 or illegality, and there is language in one Virginia case to
suggest that the same would be true in Virginia. 5° The Code Com-
47. Id. § 13.1-125.
48. Gibson, supra note 18, at 621.
49. Id. at 618.
50. "Suffice it to say, that the weight of authority is to the effect that unless the corporate
merger be tainted with fraud or illegality . . . the dissenting stockholder may pursue the
remedy prescribed by the appraisal statute." Adams v. United States Distrib. Corp., 184 Va.
134, 34 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 788, (1946).
The situation is different in Delaware:
The chief issue considered by the Delaware courts is the standard of "fairness" applica-
ble when stockholders seek to enjoin a merger as "unfair." Here the courts draw a
fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, mergers in which common stock
interests, common directors or both are significant factors in shaping the merger and,
on the other hand, mergers between corporations where "the same parties or persons
[are] not on both sides of [the] transaction." In the first situation where common
interests are important, the judicial standard is "fairness"; in the second situation,
where the corporation merges with "a third party" in an apparently arm's-length
tiansaction, the test is "fraud, or the equivalent thereof."
FoLK, supra note 1, at 333. See also Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156
A. 183, 187-90 (Del. Ch. 1931). The court in Cole said:
mere inadequacy of price will not reveal fraud. The inadequacy must be so gross as to
lead the court to conclude that it was not due to an honest error of judgment but rather
to bad faith, or to a reckless indifference to the rights of others interested. There is a
presumption that the judgment of the governing body of the corporation, whether at
the time it consists of directors or majority stockholders, is formed in good faith and
inspired by bona fides of purpose."
Id. at 1887.
Stricter standards of scrutiny are applied when the merger is between a parent and subsidi-
ary. See David J. Green & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); David
J. Green and Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., CoRP. GuiDE (P-H) 82,247 (Del. S. Ct. 1977) [applying test of "entire
fairness"].
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mission in drafting the Virginia Act has stressed that should such a
case of fraud arise in Virginia, "the courts are given jurisdiction
before the Commission acts to determine it and grant all appropri-
ate relief.""1 Mr. Gibson interprets that provision as meaning "that
any court of competent jurisdiction may consider and determine
such an issue when suitably raised.
52
The question as to the meaning of the concept of fraud is still
open:
The General Assembly and the Code Commission deliberately ab-
stained from definition. The concept of fraud has proved flexible and
evolving. It will suffice to redress the shocking case, no matter how
it should come up. But though there is no definition, the use of the
term in the context of the [Virginia Stock Corporation] Act permits
certain conclusions to be drawn. 3
Mr. Gibson then proceeds to analyze the meaning of "fraud" from
clues to be gleaned from the Virginia Stock Corporation Act. Be-
yond these indications as to the design of the legislature, the courts,
within the parameters granted by the Virginia Act, will have to
construct any expanded definition of "fraud" on the basis of an
"appraisal of actual experience."
At the outset, he states that none of the changes of rights of the
type specified in Title 13.1, such as mergers, consolidations or ac-
quisition of all or substantially all of the assets, "can possibly be
fraudulent in and of itself."54 The implication is that the same
would be true of a plan of exchange under section 13.1-69.1. In
addition, it is believed that the Virginia courts will strictly adhere
to the standard of actual fraud and not reach out to encompass any
51. Gibson, supra note 18, at 619. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-125 (Supp. 1977) which states
in pertinent part:
No court within or without Virginia shall have jurisdiction to enjoin or delay the
holding of any meeting of directors or stockholders for the purpose of authorizing or
consummating any such amendment, merger, consolidation, or exchange, or the execu-
tion or delivery to the Commission of any papers for such purpose, except for
fraud. ...
Id.
52. Gibson, supra note 18, at 620.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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concept of "constructive fraud," e.g., where the action taken is so
palpably unfair as to amount to such a fraud.55 If the courts were to
reach out and grasp the standard of "constructive fraud," it would
essentially involve assumption of a power to reexamine degrees of
fairness, which has heretofore been asserted to be contrary to the
legislative purpose.
While to be free from fraud and illegality a transaction must as a
prerequisite be in compliance with the statutory requirements appl-
icable to it, there are situations in which it is conceivable that
despite such strict technical compliance a transaction resulting in
the "freeze-out" or explusion of minority stockholders may be sub-
ject to scrutiny for breach of fiduciary duty to those minority stock-
holders where there is either a questionable business purpose there-
for or none whatsoever." Although stockholders are normally per-
mitted to act on the basis of their own interest, if it can be
shown that controlling stockholders act together as a group and have
a conflicting interest of such substantiality as to control their vote,
then they may well be required to show that the plan approved is fair
to the class for which they cast the controlling vote. This could be
done by showing a corporate need for the change or a compensatory
benefit for those adversely affected or other justifying circumstan-
ces.
57
55. See Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 133, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (Ch. 1943);
Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 57, 156 A. 183, 187 (Ch. 1931); MacFar-
lane v. North American Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 178, 157 A. 396, 398 (Ch. 1928);
MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F. Supp. 462, 466 (D. Del. 1943); Barrett v. Denver
Tramway Corporation, 53 F. Supp. 198, 201 (D. Del.), aff'd., 146 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1944);
FOLK, supra note 1, at 339-40 Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Ap-
praisal Right, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1210-11 (1964).
56. Singer v. Magnavox Co., SEC. REG. & L. REP. (B.N.A.) October 5, 1977, E-1 (Del. Sup.
Ct.). See also Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 137 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566, 574 (Supp.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1975); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), rehearing
denied, 493 F.2d 664 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844, 77 (1974); Grimes v. Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jennette, 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd without opinion 521 F.2d 812
(5th Cir. 1975).
57. Gibson, supra note 18, at 621.
In the recent case of Singer v. Magnavox Co., SEc. REG. & L. REP. (B.N.A.) October 5, 1977,
E-1 (Del. Sup. Ct.), the court was presented with the case of a short-form merger accom-
plished by a majority stockholder for the purpose of eliminating minority interests on a cash-
for-stock basis. The Delaware Supreme Court, stating that it was the duty "of an equity court
to scrutinize a corporate act when it is alleged that its purpose violates the fiduciary duty
owed to minority stockholder," held that the majority stockholder owes a fiduciary duty to
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Finally, it is necessary that the applicable notice requirements be
met. This is because adequate notice and full and fair disclosure in
such notice is essential so that the stockholders will be informed on
the question of the fairness of the transaction.
Ill. ELEMENTS OF VALUATION
Like most state dissenters' rights statutes, the Virginia provision
merely employs the term "fair value" without adequately defining
the term. The statute more fully describes what the term does not
include. Thus, the "fair value" of a dissenter's stock is not to include
any appreciation or depreciation attributable to fluctuations result-
ing from anticipation of the corporate action,5" however that is to be
determined. While a vast majority of the states have similar provi-
sos,59 there appears to be no reported case discussing the method of
the minority stockholders similar to the duty of unselfish loyalty owed to a corporaton by its
officers and directors, in the exercise of control over corporate powers and property, and that
"use of such power to perpetuate control is a violation of that duty." Moreover,
a Delaware court will not be indifferent to the purpose of a merger when a freeze-out
of minority stockholders on a cash-out basis is alleged to be its sole purpose. In such a
situation, if it is alleged that the purpose is improper because of the fiduciary duty
owed to the minority, the Court is duty bound to closely examine that allegation even
when all of the relevant statutory formalities have been satisfied.
Id. at E-6. The exercise of this duty was not vitiated in any way because of the availability
of appraisal rights to the minority. Id. at E-5.
However, the court implies that the result in this case may have been different if the merger
had not been cast, as alleged, as an attempt to completely terminate the minority's equity
interest by cashing them out, but as a stock-for-stock conversion. Id.
See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 633,
700 (1974) (arguing for establishment of standards of discharge of fiduciary duty at the federal
level), cited in the minority opinion in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See
also Minority Stockholder Freezeouts and Going Private Transactions-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW
1489 (1977).
58. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75(a); 13.1-78(a) (Supp. 1977).
59. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-081(k); CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1300(a) (West, 1977); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-374(d); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.247(3);
GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1202(g)(4); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 909(1); MD. CODE ANN. § 3-
202; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 90; MicH. Cohip. LAWS ANN. § 450, 1768; Miss. CODE
ANN. § 79-3-161; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2274(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2080; NEv. REV.
STAT. § 78-505; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-3; N. M. STAT. ANN. § 51-21-4(A); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.85(c); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.159(2); ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.437(2); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 515(B); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-74; S. D. Bus. CORP. AcT § 47-6-25; TENN.
GEN. CORP. Aar. § 48.909(5); TEXAs Bus. CORP. Act art. 15.16(E)(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-
10-76; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2004(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A-24-030; W. VA. CODE §
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computing this required adjustment," probably due to the relatively
recent addition of such provisions. In addition, the computation of
"fair value" should not include any allowance for a claim for the
value of stock options that may be lost as a consequence of the
merger or consolidation of the issuing corporation.2
The lack of an adequate statutory definition and method of com-
putation creates considerable uncertainty with which the corpora-
tions, dissenters and, ultimately, the courts have to wrestle. In Vir-
ginia, although there are numerous reported cases involving the
predecessors of both Code sections, there is no Virginia Supreme
Court case discussing in detail the methodology by which shares are
to be valued by the corporation or in an appraisal proceeding. The
main guidepost is Lucas v. Pembroke Water Company,13 an action
by the corporation to fix the value of the dissenters' stock in a sale
31-1-123(a); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.72(2); Wyo. STAT. § 17-36.72. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. Amr § 81 (1971).
60. Such an adjustment would require the sifting and disregard of many complex psychol-
ogical factors. See note 88 infra. Inasmuch as there is a relationship between concepts of "fair
value" of stock in an appraisal proceeding and the fairness of merger terms, J. Vorenberg,
Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964);
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 I-_-iv. L. Ray.
297 (1974), cases discussing the fairness of such terms may be looked to for some hint as to
the computation of such intrinsic "fair value." Such a case is Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 398, rehearing denied, 98 S. Ct. 649 (1977),
where the court sought to establish the pre-merger value of the disappearing company in a
merger. The circuit court, placing great emphasis on the pre-merger market value and the
value of the synergism generated by the combination, reversed a district court determination
that the merger terms were unfair which was based primarily on comparative earnings and
book value. The court, in computing pre-merger value said:
We must now decide what period of time should be used in calculating [the relative
value] between each corporation's stock. Since prices from the period immediately
preceding the merger are the most likely to reflect the actual value of the corporation
at the time the merger was consummated, we begin with a presumption that a short
period is appropriate. Accordingly, we hold that the average market value for approxi-
mately the six month period preceding the merger should be used unless there are
special factors indicating that this period is unreliable. Six months is long enough so
that very short-term price fluctuations will not play an unfairly important role and
short enough so that the calculated [exchange] ratio does not reflect business condi-
tions that have substantially changed as of the time of the merger.
552 F.2d at 1246-47 (emphasis added).
61. This change in the valuation of dissenter's stock under Virginia law was incorporated
in these sections when they were rewritten in 1975. 1975 Va. Acts ch. 500, at 921.
62. Lichtman v. Recognition Equip., Inc., 295 A.2d 771, 772 (Del. Ch. 1972).
63. 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147 (1964). See Gibson & Freeman, The Annual Survey of
Virginia Law: Business Associations, 50 VA. L. REv. 1265, 1278 (1964).
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of all that company's assets. The court, deferring to the trial court's
methodology of valuation, sustained its finding of a value considera-
bly less than the ascertained book value, and said that among the
elements to be weighed are market value, net asset value, invest-
ment value and earnings capacity.64 None of these elements is to be
controlling in and of itself, but where there was "ample evidence"
to support its finding, the court held "that the determination of the
fair value of the dissenters' stock upon ... conflicting evidence was
for the trial court. . . ."I' Mere book value was held not to be deter-
minative on the grounds that "had the legislature so intended, the
statute would have so provided."66 Moreover, the court held- that
"fair cash value," which was the requirement under prior law, was
equivalent in meaning to the requirement for "fair value" as used
in the present law, thus rendering relevant those cases decided
under the prior standard.
In considering the case law, the understanding of "fair value" is
enhanced by the knowledge that the "design of the Virginia statute
is to assure to the dissenting stockholder that he will be fully com-
pensated for the value of that which he has been deprived by the
merger, and no more,"6 and therefore the statute should be liberally
construed in the dissenters' favor. 8 "Fair value" therefore means
the "actual" or "intrinsic worth" of the stock "after an appraisal of
all of the elements of value."69 However, further meaning is
shrouded because there is no reported Virginia case indicating how
the elements are to be valued or how they are to fit together.
Because of this void in the case law which presents itself in any
determination of "fair value" under the Virginia section, further
clarification must be had by reference to general principles of law,
64. 135 S.E.2d at 150.
65. Id. at 152.
66. Id. at 151.
67. Adams v. United States Distrib. Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244, 249-50 (1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1946). See also Craddock-Terry v. Powell, 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E.2d 363,
374 (1943); Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills, 113 Va. 717, 75 S.E. 309 (1912).
68. See Note, Corporations - Rights of Dissenting Stockholders Pending Statutory Ap-
praisal Proceedings, 21 VA. L. Rav. 825 (1935).
69. Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63 S.E.2d 34, 36 (1951); Adams v. United States
Distrib. Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244, 249-50 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 788, (1946);
Craddock-Terry v. Powell, 181 Va. 417, 25 S.E.2d 363, 374 (1943); Winfree v. Riverside Cotton
Mills Co., 113 Va. 717, 75 S.E. 309 (1912).
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even though established by decisions in other jurisdictions. 0 Special
significance should be attached to the decisions of jurisdictions
whose standard of valuation, when reduced to its essence, is the
same as adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia; that is, "actual"
or "intrinsic value. '' 71 Two such jurisdictions are the leading states
of Delaware 2 and New York.73 What these cases produce in general
is the inescapable conclusion that there is no definite rule for deter-
mining "fair value," but that the proper result in each case will
depend on the particular circumstances of the corporation and the
type of stock involved." Even the amount of stock or other consider-
ation issued under the terms of the transaction cannot be conclusive
evidence of the value of the shares of the subject corporation, 7 al-
though much probative weight should be attached to this indicator
where the terms were arrived at through arm's length negotiations
between the corporate parties thereto.7 6
Of some comfort is the generalization that deference to the exper-
tise of the corporation and appraisers is inevitable. Courts have
been reluctant to disturb appraisers' findings unless the figures are
arbitrary or based on unreasonable premises, and likewise, unless
the corporation is unable to justify it under some reasonable method
of valuation, 77 courts will presume the fairness of the proposed offer.
70. The Virginia Supreme Court has shown a willingness in the area of dissenters' rights
to refer to cases decided in other jurisdictions both directly, and indirectly through syntheses
of these decisions in such treatises as FLETCHERS CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATION, and in such encly-
clopedias as AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE and CORPUS JURIS SECONDUM. See, e.g., Lucas v.
Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147; Adams v. United States Distrib. Corp.,
184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 788 (1946).
71. See note 69 supra.
72. Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
73. See 11 N.Y. JUR. REV. Corporations § 584 (and cases cited therein).
74. ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACr ANN. § 81, at 447 (1971); 55 MICH. L. REv. 689, 696
(1957).
75. Adams v. R. C. Williams & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 61, 158 A.2d 797, 799 (1960).
76. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 297 (1974) [discussion of mergers between parent corporations and their subsidiaries
with minority stockholders].
77. Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1964) (importance of
appraisers' report); American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225, 230 (1937);
Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (1929); Note, Valuation of
Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1453, 1454 (1966); 55 MICH. L.
REv. 689, 696 (1957).
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A. Market Value
The market value of the stock involved in the appraisal, if it can
be ascertained, is undoubtedly the most important factor in deter-
mining "fair value," and one commentator has equated Virginia's
"fair value" standard with "fair market value." '78 This position finds
support in the Home Beneficial Life Insurance Co. 79 case, in which
the Richmond Chancery Court adopted the value placed upon the
stock by the court-appointed appraiser, who had adopted the con-
sensus price of the "market makers" in the unlisted stock of that
corporation. Although the court considered the appraiser's evalua-
tion, the market value, the net asset value, and earnings capacity
of the stock, the reference to these other elements was in the opinion
letter of the appraiser. Noting no "unusual fluctuations" in price or
volume of orders in the months prior to and subsequent to the share-
holder vote, the letter stated that insomuch as there was an active
market in the stock allowing the "investing public" to appraise all
of the elements of value including "earnings, dividends, future
growth and potential and projected market environment," on a con-
tinuing basis, their informed collective opinion as to price repre-
sented the "fair value" of the stock.
The theory that market value may be determinative and thus the
sole factor to be considered where "it fairly reflects the opinion of
informed buyers and sellers" within the apparent meaning of the
Home Beneficial case is buttressed by cases in other jurisdictions,
especially New York." In addition, corporations have sought to es-
tablish market value as the sole criterion for the valuation of dis-
senting shares. "Certainly, this is the simplest, if not the fairest test
since the stock market quotations on the date prior to the date the
vote is taken will determine the value of the shares. 81
78. Note, Seventeenth Annual Survey of Developments In Virginia Law: Business
Associations, 58 VA. L. REv. 1172, 1179 (1972).
79. Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, March 28, 1973.
80. See Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923, 936, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349, 359-60 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd
mem., 270 App. Div. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605, appeal denied, 270 App. Div. 998 (1946); In re
Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 727, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (1948), modifying in part, 191 Misc. 808,
77 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1948); Jeffrey v. American Screw Co., 98 R.I. 286, 201 A.2d 146, 150 (1964);
In re Deutshman, 281 App. Div. 14, 19, 116 N.Y.S.2d 578, 581 (Sup. Ct. 1952); In re Behrens,
61 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182, 183 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1947).
81. Note, Appraisal Statutes-An Analysis of Modern Trends, 38 VA. L. REv. 915, 932
(1952).
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Where the stock in question was not listed on a national securities
market and there was no otherwise reliable market for it, establish-
ment of a market value by resort to the trading price of the last sale
of the stock, which had been several years earlier, has been ap-
proved by the Virginia Supreme Court.12
However, in light of the cases in Virginia, while major weight
should be given to the market value of listed stock having an active
market and regularly published quotations, market value on the day
prior to the vote on the proposed transaction is susceptible to
''extraneous pressures," such as fluctuations in anticipation of the
corporate action, and therefore "not too dependable as a guide to
intrinsic worth." 3 For that reason, in Virginia, market value has
traditionally not been the sole criterion used in ascertaining "fair
value."
With the addition to these statutes of the "Wall Street Rule' 84 in
1975, market value has assumed a new, but somewhat anomalous
position. Virginia has by legislation adopted the rule that where
there is a large reliable public market both for the class of stock to
be given up and (in the case of mergers, consolidations and ex-
hanges) for the stock of a corporation other than the "surviving, new
or acquiring" corporation, if any, being received, obtaining prevail-
ing market value by selling the stock is an adequate and exclusive
remedy for stockholders dissatisfied with an extraordinary corporate
transaction. Thus, the General Assembly, by eliminating appraisal
in such circumstances, has effectively made market value "the con-
clusive test of value."85 The right to dissent and demand "fair
value" then remains a possibility in Virginia only for: (1) the corpo-
ration with no reliable public market for its stock; (2) holders of
those classes of stock of an otherwise widely-held corporation which
class is not listed on a national securities exchange or held of record
by more than 2,000 persons; and (3) for those stockholders being
required to accept in a section 13.1-75 transaction a form of consid-
eration not qualifying under section 13.1-75(i)(2).
82. Lucas v. Pembroke Water Company, 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1964).
83. Woodward v. Quigley, 257 Iowa 1077, 133 N.W.2d 38, 40, modified on rehearing, 257
Iowa 1160, 136 N.W.2d 281 (1965). See also note 88 infra.
84. See discussion of the "Wall Street Rule," Section I supra.
85. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares In Corporate Mergers And Takeovers, 88 HAv. L.
REv. 297, 305 & n.20 (1974).
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As they now read, the sections set a double standard of treatment.
Qualified dissenting stockholders are entitled to receive "fair value"
for their stock, which value is to be exclusive of price fluctuations
occurring in anticipation of the proposed corporate transaction,
while those stockholders whose remedy lies under the "Wall Street
Rule" are left to a market value which will naturally reflect the
psychological factors generated by anticipation of the proposed cor-
porate transactions, which are often exacerbated by the presence of
imbalancing factors in the market for the stock, such as arbitra-
geurs.86 The problem arises that this double standard may be ap-
plied to stockholders who, while in the same corporation, hold dif-
ferent classes of its stock (because one class is widely traded and the
other not, or because one class is required to take stock not qualify-
ing under the "Wall Street Rule").Y Thus, it is possible in many
transactions involving large publicly-held corporations to structure
transactions so as to avoid the necessity of granting to dissenting
stockholders any rights under the Virginia sections.
Whether or not this double standard was intended by the General
Assembly, the fact remains that it does exist.88 Inasmuch as Virginia
86. This phenomenom has been defined as follows:
Arbitrage may be broadly defined as the purchase of property in one market and the
simultaneous or near-simultaneous sale of the same property, or its equivalent, in
either the same or a different market for the purpose of generating a profit resulting
from the differential in price for such property or its equivalent. An arbitrageur in
securities is therefore not an investor in the ordinary sense of the word in that he
engages in such transactions in an effort to take advantage of price differentials rather
than purchasing or selling securities on the basis of fundamental investment values.
E. A. ARANOW & H. A. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 174 (1973).
87. The requirement for equality of treatment with respect to giving "fair value" for dissen-
ters' stock extends to stockholders of the same class, so that all similarly situated receive
equal value. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75(d); 13.1-78(d) (Supp. 1977). See also Fein v. Lanston
Monotype Machine Co., 196 Va. 753, 85 S.E.2d 353, 360 (1955).
88. At this writing the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association has
proposed for comment changes in the Sections of the Model Business Corporation Act affect-
ing dissenters' rights, including a proposal for the deletion of the "Wall Street Rule" which
is included in its section 80. Although Virginia's version of the rule is more nearly like
Delaware's, the reasons for the deletion advanced by the Committee merit attention because
of their applicability to the general concept. The Committee puts forth four reasons for the
deletion: (1) the marketplace of the 1970's has been characterized by "depressed prices"
which it feels negates the possibility of obtaining "fair value;" (2) the unavailability of the
Rule to those stockholders disqualified from selling shares under Federal or State securities
laws because they occupy the status of an "insider" who has acquired shares within the
prescribed period, or because they possess inside information; (3) a stockholder may possess
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law recognizes that a reliable public market price is to be the con-
clusive test of value under certain prescribed circumstances, it cre-
ates a further basis for asserting that any market value which can
be ascertained as being "reliable" should be the preeminent, if not
the controlling, factor in the determination of the "fair value" of
those dissenters entitled to demand "fair value."89
B. Net Asset Value
Net asset value has been defined as the "share which the stock
represents in the value of the net assets of the corporation."' 0 The
net asset value should be determined by the "going concern" value,
rather than the liquidation value of the assets. 1 However, there are
cases in which the going concern value has been given no value, as
where the market place as of the date of the consummation of the
extraordinary transaction was less than the dissolution value of the
company.2
In order to find the current value of the assets, the present re-
placement cost of those same assets should be determined.9 3
"[T]his amount should then be depreciated to reflect age and may
be discounted further to take account of obsolescence."94 In addi-
a disproportionately large holding of stock in a "thin market;" and (4) the recognition that
psychological factors in the marketplace will inevitably influence market price. Changes in
the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights, A Report of the Committee
on Corporate Laws, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1862 (1977). The Committee, taking the view that
"corporate acquisitions are part of the normal life of corporations [and] when they do not
involve a major change in the corporation's business, they should not entitle a shareholder
to withdraw his investment," id., has proposed changes to the Model Business Corporation
Act, which in addition to its present text would have the effect of limiting the availability of
dissenters' rights substantially so as to effectuate this policy.
The Committee's points are well taken, and they should be balanced off against the conven-
ience and certainty the "Wall Street Rule" provides to the parties in an extraordinary trans-
action where it is applicable. It might also provide for the Virginia General Assembly an
opportunity to review the present double standard existing in the areas of dissenters' rights
in light of constructive proposals for change.
89. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company, 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.
Ct. 398, rehearing denied, 98 S. Ct. 649 (1977).
90. 13 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. (Rev. Vol. 1970) § 5906.14, at 271.
91. American Gen. Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225, 229-30 (1937).
92. Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (1956); Note, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1966).
93. Note, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1453, 1457 (1966).
94. Id.
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tion, in computing this valuation, Virginia apparently permits the
inclusion as assets of sums withdrawn from the corporation's treas-
ury that might be classified as an improper corporate expense, such
as excessive salaries paid to officers. 5
It has been argued that the expense involved in the appraisal of
individual assets often justifies dispensing with the asset in valua-
tion, especially where the dissenters' holdings are relatively small. 6
Earnings and market data and even estimations of the replacement
costs of capital assets are available from corporate records, proxy
material, securities markets and financial reporting services. Asset
value has also been criticized as a "liquidation yardstick, inappro-
priate because minority stockholders typically have invested for
dividend income or stock appreciation and rarely expect to share in
the physicial assets.""7 Regardless, the significance of assets cannot
be completely disregarded and, indeed, is one of the four elements
which has been specifically required to be considered in Virginia.
C. Investment Value
Although it has been held that investment value is not an inde-
pendent element because it duplicates earnings value,98 it is, none-
theless, one of the elements that should be weighed in Virginia.
Investment value has been defined as taking
account of such factors as the capitalization of the company, earn-
ings, and dividend record, position in the industry, prospects of the
business and the industry, and the overall value of its securities in
relation to general market conditions and the market values of com-
parable securities. There should be considered the rate of dividends,
the regularity with which they have been paid, the management and
reputation of the company, its prospects for the future, and all other
circumstances helpful in estimating the future course of the stock in
95. Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147, 152 (1964); Note, 79 HARv.
L. REv. 1453, 1460 (1960). See In re Marcus, 273 App. Div. 727, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76, 81-2 (1948),
modifying in part, 191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1948).
96. Note, 79 HARV. L. Rav. 1453, 1460 (1966). See In re Marcus, 273 App. Div. 727, 79
N.Y.S.2d 76, 81-2, modifying in part, 191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S. 529 (1948).
97. Note, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1453, 1460 (1966).
98. Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121, 125-6 (1956).
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the market. Good will is to be considered, and earning capacity is
always an important item."
The earnings should be averaged over several years, probably at
least five years, so as to avoid any "undue emphasis on either an
exceptionally good or bad year." In addition, the period selected
should be tailored so as to exclude factors and events that are no
longer relevant to an evaluation of earnings. An attempt also should
be made to eliminate any abnormalities in the earnings average that
really are not reflective of the earnings trend.' °° At a minimum the
[abnormal] event should be so exceptional that recurrence is un-
foreseeable; even then, perhaps it should be excluded only when the
industry is so stable that earnings would have shown a detectable
pattern but for the event in question.10'
Delaware courts have disapproved of long-range predictions of
earnings as being too speculative in nature, although the Virginia
Supreme Court in Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co.'0 2 approved consid-
eration of a projected future improvement in earnings. This view
should be considered in the light of recent trends by the Securities
and Exchange Commission encouraging the use of future economic
projections in annual reports and through the media. 113
It has been suggested that the valuation of the so-called
"intangible assets," such as good will, may be dispensed with owing
to the fact that this value is subsumed in the market value figure,
which may already be expected to reflect the investment com-
munity's opinion as to the value of intangibles. 04
On the subject of a capitalization ratio, or multiplier, deference
to the calculations of the appraisers can be expected when the result
appears to be "within the range of reason."'0 5 A similar deference
would seem to be in order for the reasonable calculations of the
99. 13 FLErCHER CYC. CORP. (Rev. Vol. 1970) § 5906.15, at 274-5. See also Note, 79 HARV.
L. Rav. 1453, 1464 (1966); 55 MicH. L. Rav. 689, 693 (1957).
100. Note, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1453, 1465 (1964).
101. Id.
102. 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1964).
103. S.E.C. Release No. 34-9984 and Release No. 33-5362 (February 2, 1973), 38 F.R. 7220,
2 FED. SEC. L. Rrm. (C.C.H.) 23,508.
104. Note, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1453, 1466 (1964).
105. Id. at 1467.
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corporation, exchange ratios which are the results of arm's-length
negotiations among the parties and certainly for the informed opin-
ions of independent investment bankers, if any.
D. Earnings Capacity
Although the Virginia Supreme Court lists earnings capacity as
one of the elements constituting "fair value," there is little evidence
of how this figure is intended to affect the valuation. ' Indeed, it is
not often considered as a separate element, but rather an element
in determining investment value. 1 Because of its inclusion within
investment value, even when considered as a separate element of
valuation, earnings capacity has been assigned a weight of zero."0 8
While this approach is certainly correct in a situation where there
is no reasonable probability of dividends in the foreseeable future,
or possibly where there is a pattern of non-payment of dividends, if
earnings capacity is truly to have an input as a separate element in
the appraisal process, this should not be the case where the corpo-
rate parties to the transaction are healthy, profitable businesses.
Perhaps the real importance of dividends comes in the computa-
tion of the interest rate in an appraisal which is discretionary with
the trial court.' 9 As Mr. Gibson has stated:
The final judgment must allow [the dissenting shareholder] interest,
though the rate remains to be found by the judge in accordance with
what may be fair and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.
An important circumstance is, of course, the earnings experience dur-
ing the appraisal proceedings. If the stock is not earning anything, no
award of more than purely nominal rate would seem to be equitable,
unless dividends were being paid, though unearned on outstanding
shares. If, on the other hand, the per share earnings are large, even
106. Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1964).
107. 55 MICH. L. REv. 689, 690-1 (1957); 13 FLErCHER CYC. CORP. (Rev. Vol. 1970) § 5906.15,
at 274.
108. For a table illustrating how the courts in Delaware have allocated the weights to the
valuation elements and a "typical" allocation situation synthesized therefrom, see Note, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1453, 1469-70 (1966).
109. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-75(f); 13.1-78(f) (Supp. 1977). See Lucas v. Pembroke Water
Co., 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1964); Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63 S.E.2d
34 (1951) (decided under prior law).
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though no dividends are paid, a reasonable rate of interest would
seem right."'
E. Weighing the Elements
As has already been stated, there is no legal formula which can
be enunciated and applied in valuation, and the determination re-
mains a matter of judgment on the facts in each case with the
weight to be attached to each factor naturally varying in accordance
with the particular facts of each case."' The method employed in
any one given case should therefore depend upon the circumstances
requiring valuation.
Once the various elements have been computed, they must be
balanced in order to arrive at a figure that will represent fair consid-
eration for the dissenters' stock. The relative weights will necessar-
ily vary according to the type of business involved, the type of stock
and any special circumstances surrounding the industry. Less
weight should be given a particular element when the estimate of
its value is unreliable. In the Delaware case of Heller v.
Munsingwear, Inc.,"' less weight was assigned to a valuation ele-
ment where it was substantially out of line with the other elements
causing the court to lose confidence in its accuracy.
In this balancing act, courts are apt to rely on the appraiser's
judgment unless it appears to be unreasonable. Thus, an
appraiser's determination will not usually be upset unless it is arbi-
trary and unreasonable or unless it appears ... that the award was,
by reason of some material and prejudicial error of law ... not the
fair value of the stock .... In short, the appraiser has a wide discre-
tionary power."'
Similarly, the Virginia Supreme Court has shown a willingness to
defer to the opinion of the trial court in valuation, which opinion
110. Gibson, supra note 18, at 471.
111. In re Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1946), a/I'd, 271 App. Div. 1007, 69
N.Y.S.2d 910 (1947).
112. 33 Del. Ch. 593, 98 A.2d 774, 777 (Del. Ch. 1953). See also American Gen. Corp. v.
Camp, 171 Md. 629, 190 A. 225, 229 (1937).
113. Note, Appraisal Statutes-An Analysis of Modern Trends, 38 VA. L. REv. 915 (1952).
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shall not be upset except where there is insufficient evidence to
support its findings."'
Deference to the opinion of the corporation should also be ex-
pected since "courts will usually presume that the proposed price
is fair unless the corporation is unable to justify it under any reason-
able technique of valuation."1 5 In Virginia, the corporation is under
a legal duty to make a "good faith" offer, and in order to comply it
would seem that the corporation would have to internally go
through the appraisal process. Therefore, such offer should, in order
to comply with the requirement of "good faith," be in and of itself
the result of the application of some reasonable valuation technique.
In determining the "fair value" of stock, it may be wise to assign
to each element of valuation an independent weight so as to avoid
any allegation that one or more elements were not considered."' In
light of the "Wall Street Rule," however, it may now be possible to
assert that the independent element of market value includes con-
sideration of the other required elements of valuation.
F. Different Classes of Stock
Even though management may have negotiated the best deal
possible in the inter-corporate transaction, holders of preferred or
preference stock may believe that the value of their preferred rights
and interests have been eroded or removed, with little or no protec-
tion or participation afforded in the continuing or surviving corpo-
rate entity. "Clearly the market values of different classes will dif-
fer, as should the capitalization ratios for earnings. 11 7
However, the dissenting stockholders holding preferred stock are
not entitled to anything more than the "fair value" of their stock.
They have no right to claim anything else, and where one such group
claimed entitlement to a "contractual value" of their preferred
stock based upon its par value plus dividends accrued but unpaid,
114. Lucas v. Pembroke Water Co., 205 Va. 84, 135 S.E.2d 147, 152 (1964).
115. Note, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1452, 1454 (1966).
116. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Chancery Court of the City of Richmond,
March 28, 1973.
117. Note, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1452, 1472-3 (1966).
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the Virginia Supreme Court denied the claim.118 Although it was
possible under the pre-1956 version of the section regarding sale of
the assets to successfully maintain such a suit in equity, the right
was found to be contained in the old wording which permitted resort
to remedies found under the "general law," and allowing the main-
tenance of a separate suit in equity for "inadequacy of considera-
tion. . . ." With the virtual identity of the wording of the two sec-
tions today, eliminating resort to the "general law," such claims can
no longer be recognized.
IV. CONCLUSION
Where the stockholder in a Virginia corporation which is a party
to an extraordinary transaction objects to the adequacy of the con-
sideration being offered for his stock or the "fairness" of the transac-
tion, he is given a choice between his statutory dissenter's rights,
acceptance of the terms or being "cashed-out" by marketing his
shares. In the absence of illegality, fraud or possibly a breach of
fiduciary duty owed to minority stockholders by the majority stock-
holder in accomplishing a "freeze-out" of the former, the appraisal
remedy constitutes the dissenting stockholders' exclusive alterna-
tive to being bound by the terms of the transaction (assuming com-
pliance with all the statutory requirements for completion of an
extra-ordinary transaction both procedural and substantive).
If any generalized conclusions may be safely reached regarding
valuation of a dissenter's shares, they must fall in three categories.
First, any determination of "fair value" is a matter of judgment to
be made upon the specific facts of the case in question, including
the reason for the valuation, the type of business involved, the type
of stock involved, any special circumstances applicable to the com-
pany and, perhaps, any circumstances that are applicable to the
industry. With the addition to the Virginia dissenters' rights stat-
utes of the "Wall Street Rule," market value, which had been an
important factor prior thereto, was raised to a pre-eminent position
and may indicate a legislative intent to render reliable market value
the "conclusive test" of "fair value."
118. Adams v. United States Distrib. Corp., 184 Va. 134, 34 S.E.2d 244 (1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 788 (1946).
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Secondly, as to appraisal rights, courts (including Virginia courts)
are reluctant to get too involved with the actual mathematics of a
stock appraisal. If the corporation's price offer is reasonable and is
the result of a rational method of valuation, courts show great defer-
ence to appraisers' opinions in adopting them as the "fair value" of
dissenters' stock. It appears that the Virginia Supreme Court will
confirm the valuation made by the trial court except where there is
insufficient evidence to support it.
Finally, the appraisal process in Virginia presents a potentially
expensive and drawn-out method to dissenters. In weighing the wis-
dom of pursuing this statutory remedy, most potential dissenters
may be dissuaded from availing themselves of it. Thus, it would
seem that only the truly large holder of stock desiring to exercise his
appraisal rights would have anything to gain by rejecting the corpo-
ration's "good faith" offer and electing to go through the judicial
appraisal procedures.

